According to former Moroccan ambassador Ahmed Fauzi, to expect lasting peace with his Arab neighbors, Israel can no longer be satisfied with strategic diplomacy, but must solve basic problems.
Israel is, in many ways, a unique state. Its diplomatic activity took place even before the official creation of the Hebrew state in 1948. In early 1897, the Zionist movement, founded by Theodore Herzl, urged its leaders to represent the nascent movement with the forces of time. A home for the Jews of the world.
The moves that prompted Great Britain to announce, on November 2, 1917, its agreement to allow the establishment of Jewish communities in Palestine, as the famous Balfour Declaration, named after the British Foreign Minister. Already a major breakthrough has been attached to the weight of important personalities of Jewish expatriates such as Lord Walter Lionel Rothschild.
After World War II, and faced difficulties to establish peace between Arabs and Jews, the United Kingdom handed over its mandate to the United Nations, which on 29 November 1947, in Resolution 181, extended the territory between Israel and Palestine. Dividing was adopted. . This recognition of the United Nations was the first step in a long journey of Israeli diplomacy to gain recognition from other countries.
This “painful delivery”, as Moshe Sherratt, the then Israeli Foreign Minister, said, has marked all of the diplomacy of the Hebrew state since its birth. The shock wave of this construction was stronger in the region where neighboring countries saw it as an illegitimate provocation of the land with the people. The states that recognized Israel were primarily those that are geographically far from the Middle East. His neighbors, who considered themselves unhappy, did not accept Fitrat.
The region witnessed an international diplomatic battle with an actual war of arms. For Israel, which was quickly felt under siege, the priority was to ensure its security on the one hand, and on the other side to be recognized as a nation among nations, while the new state was separate. International body. Hence its diplomacy first had to be remodeled on several fronts to guarantee its rescue, and later to secure its place at the concert of the nations.
Most important institutions are often run by people more willing to impose their will power than to find common ground with their Arab neighbors.
This dual concern has produced war diplomacy and aggression for this country. Because the entire state must mobilize to ensure its survival, most important institutions – the Prime Minister, Defense, Intelligence and Foreign Affairs – are often led by more and more willing people to find their will power. Common ground with their Arab neighbors.
From Mohe Dayan to Benny Gantz via Ariel Sharon and Yitzhak Rabin, it is usually the military that heads the country’s most important institutions. The same goes with Moshe Dadan, Ehud Barak or Tzipi Livni for foreign affairs, coming from the intelligence services. Other foreign ministers have come from right-wing or far-flung parties, who neither want to give anything to the Palestinians, nor to neighboring Arab countries, such as Benjamin Netanyahu or Avigdor Liberman.
For this reason, Israeli diplomacy is more reactive than activism. It rarely takes constructive initiative to make peace with its neighbors or make proposals in this direction. It prefers to negotiate to establish relations with Arab countries on a bilateral basis. Never collectively. So much so that the bold Arab peace initiative of 2002 was subsequently rejected based on UN resolutions and explicit recognition of the State of Israel, with each Arab country prioritizing settling its differences separately.
Furthermore, Israeli diplomacy never presents a clear agenda to settle confrontation with its neighbors. She often responds to external stimuli, quickly returning to her old habits as the pressure passes. This is the case with the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, first started by Israeli civil society and not by the administration, then quickly abandoned by successive right-wing governments.
Banking on Sunni-Shia divisions may not be a long-term long-term strategy to build Arab-Israeli unity
The strength of Israeli diplomacy is based on two main strengths: the participation of an expatriate is committed to its cause – although a party does not necessarily follow the politics of ruling authority, especially when it does. This is the fate of the Palestinians – and the unwavering support of the United States under both Democrats and Republicans.
The state of Israel has also been able to mobilize Iranian threats against the region’s Sunni states, a common front against Tehran, with the support of Washington. But this coalition, which does not state its name, can only be circumstantial until the basic problems in the Middle East are decidedly put back on the table to settle, starting with the Palestinian question, The state of Jerusalem. And the refugee problem is the key to any true peace.
Banking on the divide between the Sunnis and the Shias to form a part of Israeli-Arab unity may not be a long-term strategy. Neither for Israel nor for Arab countries. The two worlds, Sunni and Shia, have coexisted for centuries, and can still live in peace, provided that Iran’s tendency to intervene in the affairs of other countries is nothing. Which, we must admit, will not be easy to impose on Tehran.